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''I Will Never Forget the Sound 
of Those Engines Going Avvay'' 
A Re-exainination into the Sinking of 
HMCS Athabaskan, 29 April 1944 
Peter A. Dixon 
On the morning of 29 April 1944 the Canadian Tribal Class Destroyer HMCS Athabaskan 
was sunk in the English Channel after an 
engagement with the German Elbing Class 
Destroyers T-24 and T-27. The official 
explanation from the "inquiry into the Loss of 
HMCS Alhabaskan" claimed that Athabaskan 
sank because of two explosions, the first at 0417 
hours, and the second at 0427 hours. 1 The first 
explosion was attributed to a torpedo from T-24. 2 
The second explosion was believed to have 
occurred when fuel fires, caused by the first 
explosion. ignited the 4-inch magazine>) 
While this may seem simple and complete, 
an examination of the source material reveals that 
there is much confusion as to the actual chain of 
events. This confusion is focused on the cause of 
the second explosion. Eyewitness accounts have 
Athabaslcan being torpedoed twice on the port 
side. This explanation seems to have been 
discounted by the Board. Then there are 
Athabaslcan and Haida ·s reports of "three 
echoes" being seen on the radar and Commander 
DeWolfs assertion that GermanE-boats were 
involved. This assertion became the basis for Len 
Burrow and Emile Beaudoin's book Unlucky 
Lady: The Ltfe and Death qf HMCS Athabaskan. 
Yet this book raises more questions than it 
Opposite - Top: HMCS Athabaskan. Plymouth. 
England. March 1944. (NAC PA 115356) 
Bottom: Ship's Company. HMCS Athabaskan, 
Devonporl .. England. September 1 943. 
(NAC PA 131800) 
answers. TheE-boat mystery has been put to rest 
by Michael Whitby, in his article "'Fooling Around 
The French Coast': RCN Tribal Class Destroyers 
in Action, April 1944." He cites the German record 
of the action and states that the only German 
vessels involved were T-24 and T-27. This has 
resulted in the British inquiry being deemed 
officially correct, with credit for the sinking being 
attributed to T-24. Yet this confusion is 
compounded by the statement in the inquiry's 
report that the members of the board: "did not 
consider [whether] any other ships were present. "4 
This is a curious statement. It is quite likely that 
another ship was indeed present. Unfortunately, 
it may have been the British Motor Torpedo Boat 
(MTB) 677 (commanded by Lieutenant A. 
Clayton, RNVR). 5 
All reconstructions of the action on 29 April 
1944 have centred on the movements of Haida 
and Athabaskan beginning at 0400 hours. Yet 
the actions of all of the other participants must 
be reviewed to fully understand the situation. The 
movements of the other forces have, to date, been 
ignored. When the positions of the Tribals, the 
minelayers and the MTB's are plotted together, 
the inferences become astounding. 
It was a very tense time for the Plymouth 
Command. Men and material were pouring into 
British ports for the upcoming invasion. German 
destroyers and E-boats still posed a threat to this 
activity. During the morning of 26 April, Force 
26, consisting of the British cruiser HMS Black 
Prince, and the destroyers HMS Tartar, HMS 
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HMCS Athabaskan rei urns to Plymouth after the night action of 25 I 26 April 1944. 
Ashan.ti, with the Canadian Tribals HMCS 
Athabaskan. HMCS Haida. and HMCS Huron. 
engaged the German Elbing class destroyers T-29, 
T-27, T-24. T-29 was sunk by Haida and Huron. 
while T-27 and T-24 escaped with damage. This 
engagement was regarded as "very successful"6 
and served to affirm the tactics of the 1Oth 
Destroyer Flotilla. The unfortunate consequence 
for Athabaskan was that during this action HMS 
Tartar sustained damage, while HMS Ashanti and 
HMCS Huron were involved in a minor collision 
that put them out of action, requiring drydocking. 
Haida and Athabaskan remained the only ships 
available for operations. 
Success was short lived as disaster struck 
the Allied forces on the night of April 27. Nine 
18 
(Photo courtesy of author) 
German E-boats from the 9th Torpedo Flotilla 
attacked a convoy off Lyme Bay sinking LST 507 
and LST 537 and torpedoing LST 289 with a loss 
of 197 sailors and 441 soldiers. 7 The fact that 
the destroyer force sent to intercept them missed 
and allowed them to escape unscathed must have 
been bitter to Plymouth Command. 
"Operation Hostile XXVI" was scheduled for 
the night of 28-29 April. Hostile Operations were 
British minelaying missions as part of Operation 
Neptune and the Normandy invasion. Hostile 
XXVI was to be conducted by the 1Oth Minelaying 
Flotilla consisting of eight minelayers which were 
to be screened by MTB 677 (Senior Officer) and 
MTB 717 of the 52 MTB Flotilla.;; Haida and 
Athabaskan were to be the "Support Force."" 
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This aspect of the engagement has until now 
been totally ignored by histortans. Yet the position 
of the minefield and its proximity to the 
subsequent destroyer engagement is crucial to 
understand events. (See Plot 1) 
"unidentified vessel 205o Start Point 6'"~ 1 at 0136 
hours. Nine minutes later C-in-C Plymouth 
signalled "course estimated west speed 20 knots." 
Plymouth plotted the developing situation and 
~----=-----------;::;-.:-:-:-;;;;~~~;===;=----==::::==;--) at 030 7 hours signalled "Support 
Force to Steer SW at Full Speed for 
20 miles. "12 This message was 
received in Haida's plot at 0322 
hours. Haida altered course to 225 
and went to 28 knots. I:J At 0332 
hours course was altered to 205 then 
at 0343 hours course was altered to 
180. Commander De Wolfs intention 
was to "prevent the enemy from 
getting past to the westward." 1 ~ By 
intercepting them offile de Vierge, the 
Trtbals had a good chance of engaging 
the Germans before daylight. 
49.10 
:55 
PlOT #1 
This plot is in 2:1 scale. Each circle equals two nautical miles. 
The distance from point BB to the Radar Contact is twenty-one nautical miles. 
At 0359 hours Athabaskan 
obtained a radar contact bearing 133 
degrees at 14 miles. This was 
confirmed by Haida at 0402 hours. 
Course was altered to the east to 
close. Haida's "Plot" established that 
the Germans were steering 280 
degrees at 24 knots. At 0411 hours 
Athabaskan reported "3 echoes" 
which Haida's 271 Q radar confirmed 
The minefield was an eight-mile pentagon with 
point BB being 16.7 miles northeast of Ile de Bas. 
Haida and Athabaskan were to the west of this 
point. patrolling a box from 49 10'N to 49 5'N 
and from 04 'W to 4 l O'W. This deployment would 
allow the two Tribals to intercept any threat 
heading north. The minelaying was to be 
completed by 0330 hours and Haida and 
Athabaskan were to return to Plymouth at 0345 
hours at 20 knots. They were not expected to meet 
the enemy. The two Tribals arrived at their patrol 
position at 0200 hours. went to "Action Stations" 
and began "snaking" the patrol line at 16 knots. 10 
Meanwhile, the German Destroyers T-24 and 
T-27 had left St. Malo and were attempting to 
reach Brest to effect repairs from the action of26 
April. They were skirting the coast as T-27s speed 
was down io 24 knots. The commander ofT-27 
had issued instructions to "head for the coast and 
avoid combat" if the enemy were encountered.. 
They were detected by radar in Plymouth, and 
Commander-in-Chief Plymouth sent the signal 
with the third echo being smaller. 15 
Commander DeWolf gave the order to engage the 
enemy at 0412 hours and both Haida and 
Athabaskan opened fire with star shell at a range 
of 7,300 yards. Two minutes later Commander 
DeWolf signalled Plymouth "2 Enemy Destroyers 
bearing 115 distance 4 miles course 260 speed 
unknown bearing 014 Ile de Vierge 6 miles." 1n 
When they were illuminated by the star shells, 
the two German destroyers were completely taken 
by surprise. They reacted quickly, however, and 
began to tum away to the South, in keeping with 
their instructions. The German tactics were to 
turn and fire torpedoes upon being engaged, 
which they did. T-27 fired six torpedoes on the 
wrong beartng, actually at T-24, which had to take 
evasive action. 17 T-24 's after torpedoes were fired 
on the wrong bearing. The three from the forward 
mounting were fired on the correct bearing. 18 (See 
Plot 2). 
At 041 7 hours Commander De Wolf ordered 
a 30 degree turn to port to avoid the expected 
19 
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MANEUVERING BOARD 
PLOT #2 
This plot is in 1 :2 scale. Each circle equals five hundred yards. 
torpedo tracks. Haida did so. Athabaskan was 
400 yards astern. As they commenced the turn, 
torpedo number three from the forward mounting 
of T-24 struck Athabaskan at an oblique angle 
on the port side in the 4-inch magazine and the 
Wardroom. T-24's other two torpedoes missed 
astern. 
Lieutenant R.B. Hayward, RCN, was 
Athabaskan's Navigating Officer during this 
action. In a report he wrote on 3 May 1945 he 
recalled that: 
There were two definite explosions, one light, 
one heavy. almost simultaneously. The explosion 
caused the propeller shafts to snap, the Porn 
Porn to be thrown into the air and the whole of 
the after- superstructure to be set on fire. The 
only survivor from "Y" gun reports the stern 
broke off between "Y" gun ammunition hoists 
and the Wardroom hatch.' 9 
This blast wrecked "X" gun (the twin 4-inch 
mounting) and "Y" gun (the after 4.7-inch 
mounting), killing most of the guns' crews. 
Athabaskan sheered off to port and began to slow. 
At 0417 hours Athabaskan signalled Haida "Hit 
aft." At 0419 hours Haida altered course 90 
degrees to port and began to lay a protective 
smokescreen around Athabaskan. 20 
20 
Even while Haida was maneu-
vering to lay smoke, her guns kept 
firing, scoring their first hit on T-24 
at 0418 hours, and another at 0420 
hours. At 0422 hours T-27 was 
observed broad on Haida's 
starboard bow and fire was shifted 
to her. T-24 disappeared into smoke 
to the east. Haida altered course to 
keep T-24 ahead and T-27 on the 
starboard bow. Haida's gunnery was 
superb as hit after hit was observed. 
T-27 attempted to head inshore to 
evade. Hit repeatedly by Haida. a 
large fire broke out behind her 
forward gun making it difficult for her 
Captain to conn the ship. Blinded and 
ablaze, T-27 ran hard ashore. The 
crew abandoned ship while still being 
hit by Haida's salvoes. 21 
Stopped and on fire. Athabaskan 
had only minutes to live. The torpedo 
from T-24 had crippled her. but the 
damage was not fatal. She began to 
settle by the stern and preparations 
were made to rig for tow by Haida. The 70-ton 
pump was being maneuvered aft to control the 
flooding. As the flooding increased, Athabaskan 's 
Captain, Lieutenant Commander John Stubbs, 
DSO, ordered "Stand by to Abandon Ship." 
Athabaskan's Radar Officer. Lieutenant 
Commander Dunn Lantier requested permission 
to clear "B" Gun of star shell. Permission was 
granted. After Athabaskan fired her last round. 
"B" Gun was raked by small arms fire, killing 
Able Seaman Hubert J. Peart. 22 Seconds later, at 
the break of the foc'sle on the port side, a second 
torpedo struck. As the Canadian Naval Mission 
Overseas narrative states: "If there had been any 
doubt among survivors as to the nature of the 
first hit there could be no difference of opinions 
in their minds that this was a torpedo. "2 :1 
Lieutenant Hayward recalled: 
The Captain said that he was going down to his 
cabin for a moment. On his way back. he looked 
into the Chart house where Paymaster 
Lieutenant T.J. Brandson was putting C.B.'s 
[Confidential Books] and charts into weighted 
bags. Returning to the bridge on the port side. 
he asked who was still on the bridge. Lieutenant 
J.B. Scott replied that Lieutenant H.B. Hayward. 
himself and Leading Signalman Thrasher. when 
the torpedo struck the ship between Nos. l and 
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2 Boiler Rooms on the port side. This caused a 
terrific explosion throwing half of the boiler 
rooms in to the air. A blanket of oil followed the 
debris of red-hot shrapnel falling everywhere and 
put out all the fires except for a small one on 
the midship Oerlikon gun deck. The after half 
of the ship sank immediately while the forward 
half rolled slowly over to port and as soon as 
the mast touched the water. the after end 
commenced to sink. the bows lifted into the air 
and she sank in a vertical position ... Almost all 
those on the port side were instantly killed. while 
those on the starboard side were badly burnt or 
blown over the side. 2 '1 
This then is the disputed second explosion. 
Its effect was fatal. Athabaskan assumed a 
"sprout. position"' and sank at 0427 hours. This 
was sadly recorded in Haida ·s Ship's Log. 25 
The source of this second torpedo is the 
mystery. The official record is not clear as to 
whether or not it. was from an E-boat, or from 
one of the German destroyers. The War Diary of 
the 4th Torpedo Boat Flotilla states that T-27 and 
T-24 were the only German units in that area. 
There were no E-boats operating that night. 
Therefore. the second torpedo could not have 
come from an E-boat. 
Could the second torpedo have come from 
one of the German destroyers? Twelve torpedoes 
were fired at 0415 hours. Of those, nine were fired 
on the wrong bearing, two missed astern, and the 
last hit. At the time of the second torpedo hit, 
T-27 was on fire and aground, and T-24 was eight 
and a half miles to the east (and therefore five 
and a half miles outside torpedo range). 
However, the actions of MTB 677 and MTB 
71 7 have not been considered. If they copied the 
reports from C-in-C Plymouth they would have 
been preparing for action. Knowing that there 
were only the two Tribals, it would have been 
tactically prudent to attempt an interception. 26 
The minelayers completed their operation at 0315 
hours, which would have put the MTBs at the 
northwest corner of the minefield. 27 This area is 
exactly 28 miles from the engagement area, which 
is a 55 minute run at 30 knots. IfMTB 677 closed 
on the engagement area at 0307 hours, it arrived 
exactly on time to be picked up as the third radar 
contact at 0411 hours. (See Plot 3). 
The MTB would be steering between south 
southwest and southwest anywhere from 260 to 
245 degrees, the same relative direction the 
Germans did. Athabaskan had this contact as 
being off their port quarter, bearing 350 degrees 
at a range of 3,000 to 4,000 yards. 2e When the 
gunfire commenced at 0411 hours, the MTB had 
no way of knowing who was shooting at whom. 
He either slowed, or swung north to get out of the 
line of fire. The flash of T-24 's torpedo hitting 
A British Motor Torpedo Boat at high speed. (Phoio courtesy qj" auihor) 
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PLOT #3 
of the 28th).:11 As Haida could not be 
seen that led the Germans into 
thinking that they had been engaged 
by much larger cruisers.:32 It also had 
a tragic effect later when Haida 
returned to the area to pick up 
survivors. "Some thought at first it 
was a German ship and were keeping 
off. They did not know how the battle 
had fared and feared Haida had been 
sunk.":13 
As MTB 677 approached the 
sinkingAthabaskan, permission was 
given to clear "B" Gun of star shell. 
The flash of gun fire would have 
appeared to have come from 
nowhere, as well as expressing 
hostile intent. MTB 677 would have 
replied with machine gun fire down 
the bearing of the flash. This resulted 
in the raking of"B" Gun and the death 
This plot is in 1:1 scale. Each circle equals one thousand yards, 
or one half of a nautical mile. 
of Able Seaman Peart. Athabaskan 
survivor George Parsons has 
Athabaskan acted as a beacon and MTB 677 
closed cautiously while attempting to identify the 
target. 
Just what the MTB might have seen on its 
arrival is but another tragic element in the history 
of Athabaskan. The excellence of the Western 
Approaches "Special Forces" Camouflage pattern 
probably resulted in a misidentification. It is 
ironic that this camouflage pattern was designed 
by a British MTB captain. 29 The blend of duck 
egg blue, off-white and green was designed to 
make the entire vessel blend into the horizon at 
night. The MTB never saw Athabaskan's 
foredeck. As the "split foc'sle" pattern could not 
be seen and the after end was completely ablaze, 
identification as a Tribal Class destroyer was 
impossible. Athabaskan would have looked 
more like a "flush decked" Elbing. 
The effect of this camouflage can also be seen 
by the German account of the action. When they 
illuminated, "a number oftargets" were detected, 
none of which were positively identified as 
destroyers. 30 During the action, only Athabaskan 
was targeted as the Germans could see her gun 
flashes. (Haida was using flashless cordite having 
changed over from flash cordite on the morning 
22 
repeatedly stated that: "I saw the son 
of a bitch go across the bow like a banshee. I saw 
the white track go into the port side."'\<! The 
resultant explosion ofthe boilers caused a "large 
mushroom of white smoke" which was reported 
as having been seen from 30 miles away.'15 
Haida signalled Plymouth at 0429 hours, "My 
0414 one enemy on fire. "Athabaskan has blown 
up. "36 If MTB 677 copied this, they would have 
instantly realized their mistake. Instead of staying 
and assisting, and not knowing Haida's position 
or intentions, it withdrew to the north at full 
speed. Athabaskan survivor Able Seaman Ted 
Hewitt has stated, "I will never forget the sound 
of those engines going away ... ":l 7 
Haida observed T-27 ablaze and aground at 
0435 hours. Commander DeWolf decided to retire 
as contact with T-24 had been lost at a range of 
14,000 yards. Course was made to return to the 
area of Athabaskan's sinking. Haida signalled 
Plymouth that one destroyer had escaped 
eastwards, and requested fighter cover for 
daylight. At 0457 hours Haida stopped amid a 
large number of survivors. '18 (If 677 retired at full 
speed it would be some 12 or 14 miles to the 
north.) All concentration by the Haida's crew was 
on saving their compatriots. 
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Tension on Haida's bridge was enormous. 
The gentle breeze was hampering rescue efforts 
as the ship drifted from right to left. Those 
survivors on Haida's starboard side had difficulty 
trying to catch up. Commander DeWolf ordered 
the serviceable motor boat and the whaler to be 
lowered for the survivors. As well. eight carley 
floats were dropped. The motor boat and whaler 
were to be un-manned; at the last minute Leading 
Seaman William McClure, Able Seaman Jack 
Hannam, Stoker William Cummings manned the 
boat. Cummings started the engine and the boat 
began to pick up survivors. 
At 0448 hours C-in-C Plymouth ordered the 
Senior Officer of the 52nd MTB Flotilla to 
"proceed immediately with MTB 717 to rescue 
survivors of'Athabaskan' in approximate position 
020 Ile de Vierge 8.'' Commander DeWolf decided 
that Haida would remain for 15 minutes. The 
rate of the drift was bringing the ship dangerously 
close to a German mine field. :J!J This could be what 
Lieutenant Commander Stubbs was trying to say 
when he shouted "Get away Haida, get Clear." At 
0515 hours Haida ·s engines went "Slow Ahead." 
Reluctantly, course was shaped for Plymouth. At 
0516 hours Haida went to 31 knots. 40 In alL 
Haida rescued 42 Athabaskans. Haida signalled 
C-in-C Plymouth. and to Senior Officer 52 MTB 
Flotilla "Survivors of"Athabaskan" in position 020 
Ile de Vierge 5.5" C-in-C Plymouth recalled the 
MTBs to Plymouth at 053 7 hours as he believed 
that the MTBs would not arrive on the scene until 
an hour after daylight. 41 Thus, rescue by friendly 
forces was denied. 
What was Plymouth basing their assessment 
on? If Hostile XXVI had gone according to plan, 
all vessels would have left area BB at 0330 hours 
at 20 knots. That would have put them near 
Latitude 49 40 N some 50 miles north of the 
location of the survivors. Therefore, it would have 
taken two hours for them to reach the scene, well 
after sunrise. If the MTBs had left the minelayers 
and investigated the battle then they would be 
one hour behind that estimated position and one 
hour closer to the survivors. They would be 
somewhere around Latitude 49 20 N. They would 
also be one hour and a quarter ahead of Haida. 
In his after action report Commander DeWolf 
reported that on leaving the scene of the action 
"IFF [Identification Friend or Foe] was reported 
showing on the 242 scan of type 291 at 0530 for 
about l minute, at ranges of 55000 yards 70000 
yards and 65000 yards. These echoes only 
showed on the scan when the starboard aerial 
was switched in and it was assumed that the 
transmissions were coming from either friendly 
ships or aircraft on the starboard bow. "4 ~ Those 
ranges of 35, 2T, and 32" miles off the 
starboard bow would be consistent with the lead 
of the minelayers. The range of 55,000 would be 
exactly that of the MTB. There is no mention of 
any aircraft being spotted or heard in Haida's 
Ship's Log. 
As Haida was racing north, rescue of the 
Athabaskan survivors was continuing. T-24 had 
been ordered to return to the area accompanied 
by two minesweepers. They arrived at 0715 hours 
and began to pick up survivors. Meanwhile, 
Haida's motor cutter had picked up two of 
Haida's crew who were swept off the scramble 
nets when the ship went slow ahead at 0515 
hours. The boat's crew also picked up six 
Athabaskans and were attempting to take a 
survivor-laden carley float in tow. One of the 
German minesweepers left the others and began 
to give chase to the motor cutter. The boat's cranky 
engine was coaxed into life and the cutter 
attempted to flee. Fortunately for the motor cutter, 
the small boat had entered a German minefield 
that caused the Minesweeper to abruptly turn 
away and head back to the men in the water. In a 
remarkable feat of navigating the motor cutter 
made the hundred mile voyage across the English 
Channel to Land's End. In all, 48 Aihabaskans 
were rescued, six by the cutter and the rest by 
Haida. A total of 85 sailors were rescued by the 
Germans and became prisoners of war. One 
hundred and twenty-eightAthabaskans died. 
HMS Olfa and HMS Orwell were sent by C-
in-C Plymouth to meet Haida and give her a safe 
escort into Plymouth. Haidajoined with Ojfa at 
0635 hours and with Orwell at 0650 hours and 
proceeded to Eddystone. Haida secured 
alongside at No.1 wharf at 0909 hours and landed 
survivors at 0930 hours. 
On 3 May 1944, four Royal Navy Captains 
from Plymouth Command assembled to "Inquire 
into the Loss of HMCS Athabaskan." The 
principal document concerning events was 
Commander DeWolfs "Report of Action," and a 
copy of Haida's Track Chart. After some 
discussion and consideration, the Board 
23 
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Right: The lucky 
ones. Athabaskan 
survivors in 
England ]allowing 
their rescue. 
May 1944. 
(NAC PA 131796) 
Below: The not-
so-lucky. Sailors 
are greeted by 
Canadian Red 
Cross girls in 
London. England 
_following their 
release ]rom 
German PoW 
camps. May 1945. 
(NAC PA 166523) 
unanimously agreed that Athabaskan had been 
sunk by enemy action. the specific cause being 
either a torpedo or the explosion of the 4-inch 
magazine.'1:1 This finding seemed to contradict 
most of the survivors testimony as a message was 
sent from the Canadian Naval Mission Overseas 
to Naval Service Headquarters in Ottawa on 30 
April that stated: "Following information received 
from survivors and boats crew Athabaskan hit 
by first torpedo which blew off stern. Ship 
remained afloat till hit by second torpedo. No 
evidence of internal explosion. "44 
The Commander-In-Chief Plymouth, Vice 
Admiral Leatham wrote his report on the action 
and the Board's findings on 1 June 1944. 
Unfortunately, the copy in the Canadian records 
has the first page missing. 45 He stated that he was 
in general agreement with the Board of Inquiry. 
Paragraphs 17 and 18 contain astounding 
information: 
24 
17. Since the Board of Inquiry sat. a 
report has been received from the 
Commanding O!Ticer ofMTB 677, who 
was in command of Force "Hostile 
XXVI. .. and was returning to England 
from the vicinity of lle de Bas on the 
early morning of 29th April. that he 
saw two explosions. As he was at the 
time a matter of about 30 miles to the 
northeastward of Haida and 
Athabaskan. he was not called as a 
witness at the Board of Inquiry. 
18. His description of t.l1e explosions 
is. however. illuminating. He states in 
his report (forwarded with Plymouth 
letter No.1931 /Ply.l618 of 25th May. 
1944 Report on ·'Hostile" Operation 
XXIII, XXIV. XXV and XXVI) that at 
0416 ··an explosion was sighted 
followed by a burst of flame on a 
bearing ofs.55o W. This was followed 
at 0427 by a very large explosion with 
a large mushroom of white smoke on 
approximately the same bearing ... 
This report is the proof that MTB 677 
was at the scene of the engagement. 
First it was physically impossible for 
Lieutenant Clayton to have seen 
either of the explosions from 30 miles 
away. as the "Distance to the Horizon" 
from the bridge of an MTB at a height 
of 10 to 12 feet off the water is 
between 3.6 and 4.0 nautical miles.·' 6 
Therefore in order for the explosion 
to be seen at that distance, the height of the 
explosion would have to have been over 525 feet 
high. 47 Vice Admiral Leatham was of that view:"It 
seems most improbable that hits by a 4-inch shell 
could be discerned and described as an 
"explosion" at 30 miles. It therefore seems most 
probable that this explosion was caused by a 
torpedo. "48 The second aspect to this is that he 
has the exact times of both explosions. Had he 
been with "Hostile X.XVI" (which was exactly 30 
miles away) the time of the sighting would be later, 
and not as precise as he claims. 
The inclusion of Lieutenant Clayton's report 
and the Board's dismissal ofthe third radar echo 
with the statement that they "did not consider 
that any other ships were present." can be 
construed as an attempt to "close the book" on 
the incident. This it has done. Nowhere in any of 
the literature on this subject is there any mention 
of the MTBs on April 28-29. From Peter Scott's 
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Battle of the Narrow Seas: a History of Light 
Coastal Forces, written in 1945, through Stephen 
Roskill's War at Sea, to Correlli Barnett's Engage 
the Enemy More Closely: the Royal Navy in the 
Second World War, to Jurgen Rohwer and 
Gerhard Hummelchen's Chronology of the War 
at Sea, 1939-1945 all have Haida and 
Athabaskan chancing into an engagement whilst 
on patrol. Canadian writers have made mention 
of a minelaying operation, but stop there while 
concentrating on the engagement. 
Vice Admiral Leatham's report legitimizing 
Lieutenant Clayton's is the proof that "Operation 
Hostile XXVI" took place. What happened during 
it is the problem. 
So ended the life of Canada's second Tribal 
Class Destroyer. Athabaskan was indeed an 
"Unlucky Lady." Originally laid down as HMCS 
Iroquois, the ship sustained bomb damage while 
under construction resulting in the change ofthe 
name. Once operational the ship was plagued ~with 
mishap. It was involved in two minor collisions, 
then hit by a glider bomb in the Bay of Biscay in 
August 1943. Finally, Athabaskan was sunk by 
friendly forces as a result of misidentification. 
Official credit for the sinking has gone to T-24. 
This oversight should be corrected. 
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